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A Longitudinal Analysis of Corporate Greenhouse Gas Disclosure Strategy 
 
Abstract 
Purpose 
This paper aims to investigate the extent to which greenhouse gas (GHG) -sensitive 
companies in the FTSE 100 disclose carbon emission information in their annual reports and 
standalone reports during the period of 2004–2012, and how they respond to the launch of 
legally binding GHG reduction schemes – the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and 
the Climate Change Act (CCA). 
Design/methodology/approach 
A 42-item disclosure index is constructed to analyse the quality of corporate GHG 
disclosures. We initially chart the development of corporate GHG disclosure from 2004 to 
2012, analyse the trend of disclosure development and compare variances for the 
convergence of disclosures. Subsequently we carry out a t-test to assess the significance of 
post-EU ETS and -CCA changes and the difference between GHG trading account holders 
and non-account holders. 
Findings 
The results show that GHG disclosures have been increasing over time, both in number of 
firms making disclosures and in the amount of information being reported, which indicates 
the movement towards normativity. We also find that the disclosures reach the peak after the 
enactment of EU ETS and CCA, and firms with carbon trading accounts are more responsive 
to these schemes than those without accounts. Nevertheless, the quality of the disclosure 
remains low, which may justify the further government intervention of mandating carbon 
reporting.  
Originality/value 
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This is the first paper that has examined the regulatory effects on GHG disclosures in an 
environment where GHG emission triggers direct cost for companies.  
 
Key words: GHG disclosures, GHG emissions, institutional legitimacy theory, strategic 
legitimacy theory, content analysis 
Paper type: Research paper   
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to offer a longitudinal investigation on the quality of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
disclosures of the 25 largest, publicly listed UK companies in the utility, mining and energy 
industries over a nine-year period from 2004 to 2012. In 2005, the European Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was launched to support the EU-wide goal of reducing GHG 
emissions to the level required by the Kyoto Protocol (European Commission, 2015). The EU 
ETS mandates emission accounting and trading for companies operating in Europe in 
particular sectors, and it requires participants to develop new knowledge and advantages 
within the company (Engels, 2009) and to learn to deal with disclosure and reporting issues. 
The Climate Change Act (CCA) was then enacted in 2008 and established a legally binding 
framework to develop an economically credible emission reduction path. These new 
schemes, coupled with voluntary guidelines – such as Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), 
Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI), World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
and World Resources Institute (WBCSD&WRI) and Department for Environment Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) – create high levels of uncertainty on the reporting and disclosure of 
GHG and a need for a longitudinal study on the development of GHG disclosures.  
This paper draws from the institutional and strategic legitimacy theories (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975), which argue that the social and institutional context 
in which an organization operates determines the legitimization of the organization and its 
access to operational resources (Campbell, 2004; Cho & Patten, 2007; Cormier, Magnan, & 
Van Velthoven, 2005; Patten, 1992). By using a self-constructed index, we seek to examine 
the motivations of the companies to increase GHG disclosures over time. More precisely, we 
analyse how companies responded to the EU ETS and CCA during this period. In line with 
institutional legitimacy theory, our results show that the disclosures have been increasing 
over time, both in number of companies making disclosures and in the amount of information 
being reported. There is significant imitation of disclosures among companies within similar 
GHG exposure groups. We also find that there is a significant increase of GHG disclosure 
after the launch of the EU ETS and CCA, and companies with GHG trading accounts are 
more responsive to the schemes than those without the accounts. This result is in line with 
strategic legitimacy theory, which states that companies with more social exposure and 
pressure tend to disclose more (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; Mahadeo, Oogarah-Hanuman, 
& Soobaroyen, 2011). Nevertheless, the quality of the disclosure still remains low, which 
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may explain the incentive of the UK government to have introduced, in 2013, mandatory 
GHG reporting under the Companies Act 2006.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to our knowledge, no prior 
study has examined the regulatory effects on GHG disclosures in an environment where 
GHG emission triggers direct costs for companies. Extant literature suggests a positive 
impact of voluntary GHG reporting guidance by DERFA on corporate GHG disclosures 
(Tauringana & Chithambo, 2014) and improved transparency and convergence of GHG 
disclosures after the participation of the CDP (Matisoff, Noonan, & O'Brien, 2013). 
However, the corporate motivation of GHG disclosures and the efficacy of the mandatory 
GHG management schemes are still unknown. Second, instead of using CDP data (Matisoff 
et al., 2013; Stanny, 2013) as proxy for GHG disclosure, we develop a disclosure index 
consisting of 42 items and investigate the disclosures in corporate annual and stand-alone 
reports, which represent the source of information that various sectors of the community rely 
upon (Deegan, Rankin, & Voght, 2000). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature 
and develops hypotheses in relation to legitimacy theory. Section 3 outlines the research 
methodology, which relies on the content analysis method of data collection. Section 4 
presents the results, and in Sections 5 and 6 we present a discussion of the data and a 
conclusion.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Legitimacy theory has been widely used to explain the motivation of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure (Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002; Patten, 1992) 
based on the concept of social contract between an organization and the society in which it 
operates (Pellegrino & Lodhia, 2012). The organization makes voluntary disclosure to gain or 
maintain legitimacy with relevant stakeholders or publics (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). In the 
test of explanatory power of legitimacy theory, institutional legitimacy explains why 
companies behave in a particular way (Hall, 1977), while strategic legitimacy predicts 
companies’ behaviour in a given period (Cormier et al., 2005).  
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2.1 Institutional legitimacy and relevant CSR disclosure evidence 
Institutional legitimacy theory offers a complementary theoretical perspective to explain 
corporate social and environmental disclosures. It is concerned with the relationship between 
an organization and its environments and recognizes the influence of environment on 
organizational structure and processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & 
Caronna, 2000; Zucker, 1977). Instead of achieving organizational efficiency, institutional 
legitimacy theory is based on the premise that organizations should incorporate social and 
institutional beliefs in order to maintain their stability and legitimacy in society (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The incentive of being efficient is insufficient to 
explain why organizations are becoming homogeneous. Scott et al. (2000) adds that material 
resources and technical information are not enough for organizations to survive and compete 
in their social environments. As a result, organizations do not always rationalize decisions, 
but often take a lead from industry peers who have dealt with a similar situation, and follow a 
set of pre-existing institutionalized options (Oliveira, Junior, & Oliveira, 2014). 
The concept of institutional isomorphism indicates that organizations must take into account 
other organizations’ behaviour (Aldrich, 1979), which forms the institutional context of the 
organization in the long run and drives the organization to behave in similar ways as those 
other organizations do. An institution is thus formed when comparisons and imitations are 
made, based on an individual organization’s perception of its environment. The pattern of the 
established institutions is viewed as the symbolic representation of the social value system 
through the lens of institutional legitimacy theory (Chen & Roberts, 2010), and 
environmental disclosure, it is argued, becomes institutionalized over time as structures and 
practices that symbolize the stakeholder concern of corporate environmental issues (Scott et 
al., 2000).  
There are a limited number of studies investigating the convergence of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure. For example, Cormier et al. (2005) analyse the CSR 
disclosure quality of 70 non-financial German companies during the period 1992–1998 and 
find evidence that these companies have imitation tendencies and adopt a routine approach as 
they extend their prior period’s CSR disclosures. Kim and Lyon (2011) compare the social 
disclosure of 30 matched Australian and South African mining companies, and both 
demonstrate the legitimization offered by isomorphism and evidence the institutionalization 
of CSR disclosure in these two countries. Matisoff et al. (2013) examine the trends relating to 
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GHG disclosure, and report on the extent to which companies have increased transparency 
over time with a focus on Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions. Their content analysis of corporate 
CDP responses from 2003 to 2010 has exhibited convergence in corporate GHG reporting in 
CDP over time. We therefore posit: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a convergence of corporate GHG disclosures in the annual 
reports and stand-alone reports over time. 
2.2 Strategic legitimacy and relevant CSR disclosure evidence 
The strategic view of legitimacy theory considers the acquisition of legitimacy as a strategic 
resource for the survival of an organization (Mohamed, Sylvain, & Jacques, 2014). To gain or 
maintain legitimacy, organizations need to consider the political environment in which they 
operate. Strategic legitimacy is directly linked with political economy theory from this point 
of view. Since the expectations from the society change over time (Deegan, 2002), legitimacy 
is a dynamic process. Organizations must change their policies and performance so as to be 
perceived legitimate to operate within social bounds and norms, and to guarantee their access 
to the operational resources (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Pellegrino & Lodhia, 2012). A 
legitimacy threat or gap is formed as a result of changes in social awareness, pressures from 
regulatory or institutional sources, the media or stakeholder groups, and corporate crises 
(Mohamed et al., 2014; O’Donovan, 2002). CSR disclosure is therefore regarded by prior 
literature (Cho & Patten, 2007; Deegan et al., 2002; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Mahadeo et 
al., 2011; Patten, 1992; Wiseman, 1982) as the main corporate communication media to 
address the threats to legitimacy when companies are subject to social exposure and need to 
disclose relevant information to preserve their legitimacy with their relevant stakeholders.  
Testing the explanatory power of strategic legitimacy theory relies on the matching of ‘peak 
disclosure periods with periods of significant social, economic or political events affecting 
the company’ (Guthrie & Parker, 1989, p.351). Empirical studies yield mixed results (Cho & 
Patten, 2007; Deegan et al., 2002; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Mahadeo et al., 2011; 
O’Donovan, 2002). For instance, Guthrie and Parker (1989) investigate the 100-year social 
disclosures from an Australian mining company, BHP, but do not find the match between the 
peak of social disclosures and social events, and, therefore, they fail to conclude the primary 
explanatory power of strategic legitimacy theory of social disclosures. Patten (1992) conducts 
a study of the impact of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on corporate social disclosures of 
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petroleum companies other than Exxon and finds a significant increase in disclosures, which 
is in support of the explanatory power of strategic legitimacy theory. More recent studies of 
social disclosures notice the decrease of social disclosures in recent years and try to explain 
this through the lens of legitimacy theory. De Villiers and Van Staden (2006) argue that 
organizations will adjust the extent (upwards or downwards) and the type (general or 
specific) of social and environmental disclosures to meet the changing needs of social 
expectations and keep their legitimacy. Their study contributes to strategic legitimacy theory 
by adding this new dimension of reducing social disclosures as a legitimizing strategy. This 
also leads to the reconsideration of the previous mixed results; increased social expectation in 
one specific issue leads to increased disclosure in that issue and decreased disclosure in other 
social and environmental areas. The overall trend of CSR disclosure is therefore uncertain. 
Furthermore, the perceived change of expectation is a rather subjective issue to measure and 
to compare between different organizations, even between organizations from the same 
industry in the same country. We argue that the increase of perceived expectation is easier to 
observe than the decrease of expectation, as increased expectation could be evidenced from 
specific social agendas and events, while the decrease of social expectation is more 
‘invisible’.  
Investigating corporate GHG disclosure alone eliminates the above problem. As one 
individual aspect of corporate environmental issues, it is more straightforward to decide that 
there is increased social expectation from society, with the introduction of GHG management 
schemes. This leads to our second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2. The improvement of GHG disclosures quality is higher post EU ETS 2005 
and CCA 2008.  
Strategic legitimacy theorists argue that CSR disclosures are driven by public pressure. 
Companies from socially and environmentally sensitive industries are therefore exposed to 
more pressure and will engage in more social and environmental disclosures than those in 
less sensitive industries. Empirical studies find a positive association between operating 
industry and CSR disclosure (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Peng, Sun, & Luo, 2015), while other 
studies do not find any significant difference in the disclosures among companies from 
different industries (Mahadeo et al., 2011). We argue that the mixed results could be caused 
by the same reason above: industries might respond differently to different social and 
environmental threats. Membership of lobby groups is another essential legitimacy-based 
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variable (Chauvey, Giordano-Spring, Cho, & Patten, 2015). There is a positive association 
between industry membership and organizational CSR disclosure found in previous literature 
(Campbell, 2004; Chauvey et al., 2015; Deegan & Gordon, 1996). In terms of climate 
change, we further argue that companies with a GHG trading account are more GHG-
emission sensitive, and thus are more willing to make GHG disclosure to the public to 
demonstrate their legitimacy in their operations (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Hence our next 
hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 3. GHG trading account holders are more likely to make better quality GHG 
disclosures than non-account holders. 
Hypothesis 4. GHG trading account holders are expected to make better quality GHG 
disclosures than non-account holders after the introduction of EU ETS and CCA. 
3. Method 
We use data drawn from 306 annual and standalone reports published by 25 FTSE 100 
companies (based on the 2012 FTSE 100 list) in the utility, mining and energy industries, 
which are deemed to be the top three industries for GHG emissions (CDP, 2012), over the 
period 2004–2012. This sample group is designed to represent companies most exposed to 
GHG emission regulations, guidelines and public pressure. The sample selected provides a 
unique setting in which to investigate the issues raised for three reasons. First, in the study 
period, EU ETS was launched to mandate emission accounting and trading for companies 
operating in Europe in particular sectors, and requires participants to develop new knowledge 
and advantages within the company (Engels, 2009). The CCA, enacted in 2008, established a 
legally binding framework to develop an economically credible emission reduction path. 
Second, we are able to split the study period into four distinct periods – pre- and post- both 
EU ETS and CCA – which enables us to capture the effects of these schemes. Third, the 
selection of GHG-sensitive industries provides us with an opportunity to examine the extent 
to which the GHG disclosures have been gradually improved in response to the guidance and 
regulations. As an emerging topic, GHG emission disclosures are inconsistent, even by the 
largest international companies (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005); selecting the most GHG-sensitive 
industries enables sufficient data for trend and statistical analysis.  
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The sample comprises 12 GHG trading account holders and 13 non-GHG trading account 
holders, using the European Commission database of European Union Transaction Log1. In 
the transaction log we use the database of Operator Holding Accounts. Account holder means 
a person who holds an account in the registries system.  
Deegan (2002) indicates that financial report disclosures are used by the management of 
companies as a legitimizing tool, and the annual report is the most important media for 
companies to communication to their stakeholders and the public (Adams, Hill, & Roberts, 
1998). Information disclosed in annual reports are widely used in previous research (Cho & 
Patten, 2007; Mahadeo et al., 2011; Patten, 1992; Wiseman, 1982). In addition to annual 
reports, we also use CSR and/or standalone reports to examine the quality of corporate GHG 
disclosures. We do this for the following reasons. First, GHG reporting is more technical than 
other social and environmental issues; companies prefer to provide more detailed GHG 
information in their standalone reports rather than their annual reports. Second, while the 
social and environmental information in annual reports is not usually audited, the existence of 
more and more standalone reports enhances the credibility and quality of the information 
disclosed. 
The annual reports and standalone reports are downloaded from companies’ websites. The 
final sample comprises 207 firm-year observations and 306 corporate annual and standalone 
reports.  
3.1 Measures 
To measure corporate GHG disclosure, existing literature mainly uses the CDP data either as 
the proxy for the existence of GHG disclosure of companies and/or as proxy for the quality of 
GHG disclosure (Kolk, Levy, & Pinkse, 2008; Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2014; Stanny, 2013). CDP 
change their questionnaire over time and the company’s response is also in a state of constant 
change (Kolk et al., 2008; Liao et al., 2014). Using CDP data is therefore not suitable for this 
longitudinal analysis and comparison. Another data source of existing GHG disclosure 
literature is content analysis of annual reports and/or CSR reports, which is more 
discretionary than corporate response to the CDP questionnaire (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; 
Peng et al., 2015). For the purpose of this study, qualitative content analysis is more 
appropriate to assess the quality of corporate GHG disclosure than the quantity of disclosures 
                                                
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/welcome.do?languageCode=en 
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(Mohamed et al., 2014; Wiseman, 1982).This paper extends prior studies by using a self-
constructed 42-item disclosure index under three main themes: Engagement and Strategy, 
Performance and Measurements, and Risks and Opportunities. Besides the extant 
environmental disclosure and GHG emission studies, the index design closely follows certain 
GHG accounting and reporting guidelines, which include: GRI, WBCSD&WRI, DEFRA, 
CDP and GHG accounting and reporting literature (Cook, 2009; Hopwood, 2009; Kolk et al., 
2008; Lohmann, 2009), and also the research associations of corporate GHG emission 
accounting and reporting issues.  
A score of ‘1’ is awarded for each item in the index when the information is disclosed in 
either annual reports or standalone reports; a score of ‘0’ is otherwise given. The total score 
thus ranges from 0 to 42.  
We initially chart the development of corporate GHG disclosure from 2004 to 2012 and 
analyse the trend of disclosure development, and compare the variances for the convergence 
of disclosures (Cormier et al., 2005). We subsequently carry out a t-test (Cho & Patten, 2007; 
Mahadeo et al., 2011) to assess the significance of post-EU ETS and -CCA changes and the 
difference between GHG trading account holders and non-account holders. 
4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive data are provided in  
Table 1. There are fewer observations for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006 as the annual reports 
and/or standalone reports are not available from the companies’ websites. This gives rise to 
an unbalanced panel dataset with 207 firm-year observations. From the results, it is clear that 
there is an upward trend of corporate GHG disclosure since 2004. The mean score increases 
from 9.37 in 2004 to 20.04 in 2012, which represents a 113.9% increase and a significant 
improvement of corporate GHG disclosure in the last nine years. If compared with the 
maximum score of 42 that a company could get, the level of disclosure is still at a relatively 
low level. Until 2011, there are companies that do not make any GHG or climate change 
disclosures and so have a score of zero in 2011. The results are in line with extant literature 
that corporate GHG disclosure is still in its infancy and lacks consistency (Freedman & Jaggi, 
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2005). The standard deviation declines by 20.9% from 2004 to 2012, indicating that GHG 
disclosures among companies are characterized by a reduced degree of variety and an 
increasing convergence over time. The coefficient of variation is also significantly reduced 
by 63%, from 1.046 to 0.387 during the time period, which indicates that the disclosure 
quality is much less dispersed in year 2012. These results support Hypothesis 1, thus 
suggesting that imitation is taking place among companies over time.  
Table 1 Summary statistics of sample disclosures 
Year N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Std. 
deviation 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Y2004 19 0 27 178 9.37 9.805 1.046 
Y2005 20 0 29 197 9.85 10.127 1.028 
Y2006 21 0 29 261 12.429 10.142 0.816 
Y2007 22 0 34 326 14.818 10.883 0.734 
Y2008 25 0 35 380 15.20 11.064 0.728 
Y2009 25 0 33 414 16.56 10.572 0.638 
Y2010 25 1 35 455 18.20 9.622 0.529 
Y2011 25 0 33 498 19.92 8.573 0.430 
Y2012 25 
 
6 
 
33 
 
501 
 
20.04 7.759 0.387 
Total 207      
 
A time evolution comparison between quantitative and qualitative disclosure is presented in 
Figure 1. The percentage is calculated by the actual disclosure score as a percentage of the 
maximum score of this type of disclosure. Two almost parallel lines can be seen in the figure, 
which indicates that companies improve their quantitative and qualitative disclosures at 
generally the same time, and companies do not increase any types of disclosure specifically 
after the launch of EU ETS and CCA. However, an overall preference for qualitative 
disclosure can be noticed. Companies only meet 15% of expected quantitative GHG 
disclosure in 2004 while meeting almost 30% of expected qualitative disclosures. In 2012, 
these figures have increased to approximately 35% and 55% respectively. The quantitative 
disclosure is yet to be satisfactory, with less than half of the expectations. 
From the analysis above, there is an overall improvement of corporate GHG disclosures 
during the period 2004–2012. It is, however, not obvious to see the yearly change of the 
disclosures from these figures. Therefore further investigation is conducted using t-tests to 
examine whether corporate GHG disclosures change significantly after the launch of GHG 
trading and reduction schemes. 
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Figure 1 Percentage of quantitative and qualitative disclosures made by sample companies from 2004 to 2012 
4.2 T-test for yearly disclosure change 
A paired samples t-test is used to test the hypothesis of equality of variances and to identify if 
there is statistical significance of corporate disclosure change during the period 2004–2012. 
In this case, t-tests are conducted for each contiguous two-year group (e.g. the disclosure 
scores of 2004 and 2005, the disclosure scores of 2005 and 2006, etc). The results of paired 
sample t-tests of sample companies’ yearly GHG disclosures are presented in  
Table 2. As highlighted in the table, the means of variance of each pair sample are all less 
than zero, indicating that the disclosure scores in later years are higher. The mean disclosure 
score of 2006 is 2.55 higher than that of 2005, where p-value equals 0.003, which is 
statistically significant at 0.05 level. The differences of pair 3 (year 2006 and year 2007), pair 
5 (year 2008 and year 2009), and pair 6 (year 2009 and year 2010) are all statistically 
significant (p < 0.05, two-tailed), which means corporate GHG disclosures significantly 
improved after the launch of EU ETS 2005 and CCA 2008, and the impact of the schemes 
last for one more year after the schemes have been introduced. For the rest of the paired 
samples, p-values are greater than 0.05 – therefore the variances are not significant, which is 
in support of Hypothesis 2. 
The t-test relies on a number of assumptions as it is a parametric test. In this case, as the 
sample size is relatively small, a normality test is not as reliable as for a large sample. 
Wilcoxon matched-paired tests are conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 21 and the results 
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are essentially equivalent to the results of the parametric tests. This method is used in extant 
literature for the reliability of the results (Cho & Patten, 2007; Mahadeo et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, it is also found that the standard deviations significantly increase after the 
enactment of EU ETS 2005 and CCA 2008, which is consistent with Mahadeo et al. (2011) 
study, which finds that there is a significant increase in the variety of CSR disclosures in 
annual reports in response to the enactment of Code of Corporate Governance and in order to 
satisfy the multiplicity of social expectations. It provides further evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 2.  
Table 2 Results of paired samples t-tests of yearly disclosures 
 Paired differences t df Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean Std. 
deviation 
Std. 
error 
mean 
95% Confidence 
interval of the 
difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 score2004–score2005 
−1.00000 2.78887 .63981 −2.34419 .34419 −1.563 18 .135 
Pair 2 score2005–score2006 
−2.55000 3.36350 .75210 −4.12417 −.97583 −3.390 19 .003 
Pair 3 score2006–score2007 
−2.95238 3.78783 .82657 −4.67658 −1.22818 −3.572 20 .002 
Pair 4 score2007–score2008 
−1.00000 3.19225 .68059 −2.41537 .41537 −1.469 21 .157 
Pair 5 score2008–score2009 
−1.36000 3.21299 .64260 −2.68626 −.03374 −2.116 24 .045 
Pair 6 score2009–score2010 
−1.64000 3.83927 .76785 −3.22477 −.05523 −2.136 24 .043 
Pair 7 score2010–score2011 
−1.72000 4.17852 .83570 −3.44481 .00481 −2.058 24 .051 
Pair 8 score2011–score2012 
−.12000 4.64866 .92973 −2.03887 1.79887 −.129 24 .898 
 
4.3 Difference in disclosure between account holder and non-account holder 
Table 3 presents the descriptive analysis for GHG disclosures of GHG trading account 
holders and non-GHG-account holders from 2004 to 2012. GHG disclosures of both account 
holder companies and non-account holder companies are relatively low in the earlier years. 
For example, the disclosure score of account holder companies is 14.1 in 2004 while it is only 
4.1 for non-account holder companies; the maximum score a company could get is 42. The 
disclosures of account holder companies are higher than that of non-account holder 
companies throughout all the nine years, and the average scores of these two groups 
developed almost in parallel. One of the criteria for using a parametric t-test is the assumption 
that both populations have equal variances . In Table 5, all p-values of Levene’s test are 
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greater than 0.05, therefore equal variance assumptions are accepted when interpreting the t-
test results. All the t-tests results are significant with p < 0.05, indicating that the disclosures 
of GHG trading account holder companies and non-account holder companies are statistically 
and significantly different. Therefore account holder companies tend to disclose more GHG 
information than non-account holder companies – Hypothesis 3 is thus supported.  
Interestingly, the difference in disclosure between these two groups is decreasing gradually 
over the years. In 2004, the average disclosure of non-account holder companies is 70.84% 
less than account holder companies, while this figure decreases to 30.61% in 2012. 
Furthermore, the yearly disclosure improvement data shows that, in general, non-account 
holder companies improve their GHG disclosures at a more rapid speed. In terms of reaction 
to the enactment of EU ETS and CCA, GHG trading account holder companies are more 
responsive to the introduction of these schemes, with disclosure improvement of 0.09 for 
account holder and 0.07 for non-account holder companies in 2005, and of 0.05 for account 
holders and 0.02 for non-account holders in 2008. These are the only two years when account 
holder companies improve their GHG disclosure more than non-account holder companies 
across the time period 2004–2012 (  
 16 
 
Table 4). The result is in support of Hypothesis 4. 
Table 3 Descriptive analysis for account holders (AH) and non-account holders (NAH) 
  
 STATUS N Mean Difference % Std. deviation Std. error mean 
Year2004 AH 10 14.1000  9.31486 2.94562 NAH 9 4.1111 -70.84 7.72082 2.57361 
Year2005 AH 10 15.3000  9.64999 3.05159 NAH 10 4.4000 -71.24 7.57481 2.39537 
Year2006 AH 11 17.1818  9.50598 2.86616 NAH 10 7.2000 -58.10 8.37722 2.64911 
Year2007 AH 11 20.3636  7.54020 2.27345 NAH 11 9.2727 -54.46 11.14532 3.36044 
Year2008 AH 12 21.4167  8.19599 2.36598 NAH 13 9.4615 -55.82 10.43724 2.89477 
Year2009 AH 12 22.2500  8.33530 2.40619 NAH 13 11.3077 -49.18 9.87745 2.73951 
Year2010 AH 12 22.4167  9.28790 2.68119 NAH 13 14.3077 -36.17 8.47924 2.35172 
Year2011 AH 12 23.8333  6.56206 1.89430 NAH 13 16.3077 -31.58 8.83539 2.45050 
Year2012 AH 12 23.8333  7.08177 2.04433 NAH 13 16.5385 -30.61 6.83880 1.89674 
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Table 4 Yearly disclosure improvement rate (IR) for account holders (AH) and non-account holders (NAH) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AH IR N/A 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.00 
NAH IR N/A 0.07 0.64 0.29 0.02 0.20 0.27 0.14 0.01 
 
Table 5 Independent samples t-test of account holders and non-account holders 
 Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std. error 
difference 
95% Confidence interval of 
the difference 
Lower Upper 
Year2004 .712 .411 2.527 17 .022 9.98889 3.95216 1.65055 18.32723 
Year2005 .559 .464 2.810 18 .012 10.90000 3.87943 2.74961 19.05039 
Year2006 .073 .790 2.541 19 .020 9.98182 3.92757 1.76132 18.20232 
Year2007 1.112 .304 2.734 20 .013 11.09091 4.05724 2.62766 19.55415 
Year2008 .134 .717 3.166 23 .004 11.95513 3.77583 4.14423 19.76602 
Year2009 .036 .852 2.980 23 .007 10.94231 3.67186 3.34648 18.53813 
Year2010 .280 .602 2.282 23 .032 8.10897 3.55292 .75920 15.45875 
Year2011 .641 .431 2.401 23 .025 7.52564 3.13488 1.04065 14.01063 
Year2012 .040 .843 2.620 23 .015 7.29487 2.78465 1.53437 13.05537 
 
5. Discussion  
The findings of this study show a significant improvement of corporate GHG disclosures 
from 2004 to 2012 and a statistically significant increase after the launch of EU ETS and 
CCA. The introduction of EU ETS and CCA caused increasing expectations regarding how 
companies conduct business. The disclosure of GHG emission information serves as an 
instrument for generating favourable impressions of companies and therefore preserving 
organizational legitimacy. The results are in support of strategic legitimacy theory, which 
posits that peak disclosure periods match with significant social, economic or political events 
affecting the companies (Guthrie & Parker, 1989). Previous studies show mixed results. 
Some studies find a significant relationship between community concern for particular social 
and environmental issues and corporate CSR disclosures (Deegan et al., 2002; Gray et al., 
1995; Patten, 1992), while other studies fail to confirm legitimacy theory as the primary 
explanation of corporate CSR disclosure (Guthrie & Parker, 1989), or suggest that legitimacy 
could be one of the causes that drive corporate CSR disclosure status (Bebbington, Larrinaga-
González, & Moneva-Abadía, 2008; Campbell, 2004). A plausible reason for the mixed 
results could be that these studies examine the disclosure of a variety of social and 
environmental issues, as companies will adjust the extent (upwards or downwards) and the 
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type (general or specific) of social and environmental disclosures to meet the changing needs 
of social expectation to maintain their legitimacy (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006). 
Therefore, one of the advantages of this study is that it only focuses on climate change via the 
GHG emission problem, which eliminates the impact of other CSR issues. 
Although EU ETS and CCA are legally binding, the disclosure of GHG emission 
performance and management remains voluntary and is at management’s discretion. It is 
argued that climate change creates a legitimacy threat for companies (Pellegrino & Lodhia, 
2012).Companies have incentives to use disclosure to gain and maintain their legitimacy 
when facing exposures to the social and political processes through which social legitimacy is 
monitored and bestowed (Chauvey et al., 2015; Patten, 1992). The increase in GHG 
disclosure therefore indicates management’s perception of a legitimacy gap and their use of 
GHG disclosure to respond to the increased expectation from society. GHG trading account 
holders are more responsive than non-GHG trading account holders. The disclosures of 
account holders are significantly better than those of non-account holders, while the 
improvement rate of GHG disclosure of non-account holders are higher than account holders. 
One of the possible explanations is that account holders have a better understanding of their 
GHG emission activities and more expertise in dealing with GHG emission information. 
Account holders work closely with the regulatory bodies, who in turn expect more 
disclosures from them. They already represent the best practice in GHG reporting and 
disclosures and therefore do not have the room to make further improvement. Nevertheless, 
when facing increased climate change concern – for example, after the introduction of EU 
ETS and CCA – account holders encounter increased expectation and make immediate 
responses to meet the expectations. The results in this study are consistent with prior 
evidence and in support of the notion that companies with more GHG emission exposure face 
greater social and political pressures and so use disclosures as a legitimacy tool to reduce 
these legitimacy threats. 
Although GHG disclosures of the sample companies significantly improved during the period 
from 2004 to 2012, the quality of the disclosures remains low, especially with low levels of 
quantitative and monetary disclosures. The results are consistent with prior evidence, which 
suggests that the disclosures have been increasing across time, both in the number of 
companies making disclosures and in the amount of information being reported (Bebbington, 
Kirk, & Larrinaga, 2012; Deegan & Gordon, 1996), while the quality of the disclosures 
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remains quite low (Bebbington et al., 2012; Chauvey et al., 2015). Some of the items in the 
disclosure index are even decreasing during the period. For example, the percentage of 
companies that disclose the amount they fund other organizations in GHG reduction research 
reduces to 8% in 2012, while it peaks at 23% in 2007. Some items in the index are paired in 
both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. For example, 88% of companies indicate their 
investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy, however only 28% disclose the real 
amount of investment they made. 64% of companies mention their investment in lower-GHG 
technology, while only 12% of companies quantify the amount of investment. The amount of 
quantitative disclosures in annual and standalone reports is much lower than that of 
qualitative disclosures, and the difference has become more significant during the last nine 
years, as analysed above. The results are consistent with what is found by (Chauvey et al., 
2015). They argue that reporting appears to become the norm and seems to be more about 
legitimization than transparency, and this is caused by the lack of normativity of the new 
regulation.  
6. Conclusions, limitations and future research 
This paper investigates the longitudinal development of corporate GHG disclosures and how 
companies respond to the enactment of GHG reduction schemes. Our empirical results have 
shown that there is an overall increase in the quality of GHG disclosures during the period 
2004–2012. However, this is a gradual change which is reflected in the achievement of a 
statistically significant increase of disclosures after the enactment of EU ETS and CCA. The 
results are consistent with prior social and environmental disclosure studies (Deegan et al., 
2002; Gray et al., 1995; Hogner, 1982; Lodhia, 2011; Patten, 1992b) and resonate with the 
stratigic legitimacy perspective (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). But the mechanisms of the 
disclosure development seem to be complex. Further study of the disclosures between GHG 
trading account holders and non-account holders suggests that the former group disclose 
significantly more than the latter and are more responsive to the enactment of GHG reduction 
initiatives, while the disclosure improvement rate is lower than those of non-account holders, 
except after the enactment of the schemes.  
It is concluded that the development of corporate GHG disclosure is a process of both 
legitimization and institutionalization. Companies mainly use social and environmental 
disclosures for legitimization rather than transparency, in response to social and political 
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pressures from stakeholders. Companies tend to model themselves after those in a similar 
GHG-sensitive group that are perceived to be more legitimate and successful. This explains 
the continuously gradual improvement of corporate GHG emission disclosures. The 
enactments of EU ETS and CCA coerce the improvement of GHG disclosures, which would 
otherwise create significant threat to corporate legitimacy. The development of GHG 
disclosure also follows the normativity of CSR disclosure practice as suggested by 
(Bebbington et al., 2012)). Our study extends the previous studies of the normativity of 
mandatory reporting to voluntary reporting practices and argues that it may take longer for 
voluntary reporting to become normative, as corporates only respond to mandatory GHG 
reduction schemes through significant GHG disclosure improvement. Nevertheless, the 
quality of the disclosures remains low, especially with low levels of quantitative and 
monetary disclosures, and the GHG reporting at the moment seems to be more about 
legitimization than transparency. The results therefore justify the governmental intervention 
of corporate GHG disclosure.  
This study contributes to the corporate GHG accounting and disclosure literature. It provides 
an overview of expected disclosures from government, lobby groups and other climate 
change related institutions by building up a comprehensive GHG disclosure index based on 
extant environmental and GHG disclosure literature and GHG reporting guidance and 
regulations. Our study also contributes to the understanding of current UK GHG disclosure 
practice; there is very limited research in this area (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005). Furthermore, 
we shed light on the explanatory power of legitimacy theory by employing both longitudinal 
and statistical studies of corporate GHG disclosures. The findings have important 
implications for corporate top management and government, who are interested in improving 
corporate GHG reporting strategy and practice. 
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